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Reasoning skills of a certain sort are taught well in the traditional
law school curriculum. No matter how good her previous education,
the typical law student surely acquires an improved facility at testing
propositions by considering hypothetical applications. Many students
learn a lot about linguistic indeterminacy, unintended consequences,
the allocation of decision-making responsibility, and how much turns
on which questions are asked and how they are framed. It is a rare,
indeed obtuse, person who completes a legal education still
temperamentally inclined to refute unwelcome ideas when distin-
guishing them will do.
Where legal education falls short, I think, is with respect to
reasoning skills that require patience, attention to detail, selectivity,
and a sense of argumentative architecture. Surprisingly, law graduates
are not noticeably better than persons trained in other disciplines at
constructing or criticizing complex arguments. Even the brightest of
fledgling lawyers seldom produces a well formulated appellate brief
in her initial efforts. Tenure articles written by young law professors
are notorious for their distended proportions, reflecting the
determination of the untrained writer to leave none of his thoughts or
research findings unreported.' Law schools teach many skills
effectively but sustained analysis and argumentation are not among
them.
If this observation is accurate, some features of the law school
experience help to explain the phenomenon. Most teaching is done in
classes of fifty or more students, not infrequently as many as one
hundred fifty. Such reasoning in the large does not preclude attention
to counter-arguments and analytic precision, but it does discourage
any kind of patient, extended, step-by-step critique-the larger the
audience, the shorter the collective attention span. Apart from class
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1. See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, Prior Restraints on Demonstrations, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1481
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CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
size, courses and casebooks typically attempt to cover so many
different issues that there is little time to explore implications or
develop criticisms beyond the first level. Endemic coverage pressure
also causes teaching materials to be edited in a certain way, with
almost no opinions reproduced in full and the secondary literature
presented only in snippets. The result is that students are rarely asked
to track a judge's or commentator's argument from start to finish.
And, because the reading of appellate briefs is even rarer than the
study of unedited opinions and articles, students hardly ever learn
how the masters of that genre construct their arguments. Such
ambitious writing as occurs in a legal education is seldom supervised
by seasoned scholars who have a craft to impart and demanding
intellectual standards to instill. Typically, inexperienced writing
instructors and student journal editors provide most of the feedback.
The traditional examination system tests the student's ability, under
severe time pressure, to spot arguments (not simply issues, as critics
often maintain) but not the ability to unpack or evaluate those
arguments to any great degree.
Seminars, of course, offer opportunities to engage in close
reading and the unhurried processing of arguments. My impression,
however, is that most seminars are not designed to serve that
purpose. Seminars also present opportunities for in-depth research, as
well as the transmission of specialized knowledge in a small group
setting. The seminars I took as a student and taught as a young faculty
member rarely involved the systematic assessment of arguments that
all members of the class had read with care. Instead, the norm was a
ton of reading, much of it included largely for informational purposes,
and great disparities in student engagement depending on how the
day's topic meshed with the individual research projects in progress.
No doubt the most conscientious seminar teachers use such research
papers to conduct intensive one-on-one instruction in reasoning,
sometimes by requiring preliminary drafts that receive detailed
critical comments and suggestions for rewriting. That form of
teaching is invaluable, but in truth, how many students actually
experience it?
Those teachers who believe, as I do, that advanced instruction in
reasoning skills constitutes an important part of a good legal
education ought to be looking for ways to provide such instruction on
a larger scale, and with an effort less heroic than is represented by the
model of seminar teaching just described. In recent years, the desire
to do so has led me to tinker with my classes quite a bit. This
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symposium seems an appropriate occasion to recount what I have
stumbled upon in the pedagogic wilderness.
I teach three types of offerings: a course on contemporary First
Amendment doctrine, usually on speech alone, sometimes on religion
alone, occasionally on both; a course on the history of ideas relating
to religious and political liberty; and a seminar on First Amendment
theory. The one teaching technique that I employ in all of these
offerings is the requirement that students write a ten-page (3500-
word) critique of one substantial argument (judicial opinion,
philosophic essay, law review article) from a short list of choices
identified at the beginning of the course. I specify exactly what I
mean by a critique and enforce the word limit strictly. I make this
single paper, designedly neither long nor wide-ranging nor heavily
researched but hopefully the product of many weeks of re-reading
and focused critical reflection, the major component of each student's
grade. In other respects the different courses I teach vary
considerably, but they all have in common the centrality of the ten-
page critique. In none of my courses do I give an in-class examination
based on hypothetical fact situations. No longer do I read bluebooks
for a living!
In courses on contemporary doctrine, my principal objective is to
induce students to treat the individual case as the basic unit of
reference. That may seem elementary but I fear that the coverage and
editing trends described above have caused too many students to
embrace a "connect-the-dots" approach to the study of doctrine,
placing far too much emphasis on "tests" and patterns of results.
These phenomena are not unimportant but attention to them must
not be allowed to displace or dwarf the inquiry into whether a
particular dispute has been resolved in a convincing fashion.
To that end, I avoid using casebooks with extensive notes, no
matter how well done. My experience is that students use such notes
as a crutch. Deprived of the passive pleasure of amassing more
information about the subject under consideration, the diligent
student is more likely to engage the reasoning of the featured case.
Teaching materials that present unedited or lightly edited versions of
the opinions work best in this regard. Especially important is a
relatively full treatment of dissents. I have been impressed by how
much a well-reasoned dissent contributes to the willingness of
students to take apart a majority opinion. When teaching the religion
clauses-the most luxurious of my courses in terms of the relative
absence of coverage pressures-I use exclusively unedited opinions.
1999]
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Further to encourage a focus on the individual case, I require
each student, four times during the semester, to write a short paper
(two to three pages) devising a hypothetical case that tests either the
validity or the implications of one of the principal judicial opinions to
be studied during the week the paper is due. The paper not only
describes the testing fact situation but also explains in what ways the
challenge of that fact situation puts pressure on the reasoning in the
principal case. Often I introduce these student-generated hypothetical
cases into the class discussion.
The most important way that I direct attention to the individual
case is by requiring, in lieu of a final examination, a ten-page critique
of just one opinion, usually a majority opinion but occasionally a
dissent. Students select their opinion to critique from a list of about
ten that I provide the first day of the course. I urge them to make this
selection as early as possible, arbitrarily if necessary, and to engage in
a probing re-reading of the opinion, taking detailed notes, at least
once a week throughout the semester. I preach how much they will
gain from their seventh re-reading over what they understood on
their sixth. Persons working on the same case are encouraged to seek
out each other to exchange ideas, though collaboration at the writing
stage is prohibited. To excel in an exercise of this sort, in which
everyone has the time and incentive to do careful and cogent work,
students realize that they will have to push themselves to do their
absolute best in terms of both rigor and creativity. Or so I tell them
more often than they want to hear. (Shameless nagging is underrated
as a teaching technique, I have come to believe.) I stress to students
the importance of fine tuning their arguments and not overreaching.
No reasoning skill do I emphasize so much as that of identifying,
imaginatively not grudgingly, the strongest points that might be made
against one's thesis and responding forthrightly to those objections.
To ensure that this absorption in one case does not lead
enterprising students to ignore the rest of the course, I give a multiple
choice examination that is designedly easy for those who have done
the work; ordinarily, half the class gets all forty questions correct.
This exercise also employs the individual case as the unit of reference.
The questions are about who won a particular dispute and on what
rationale, not which general test governs an area.
The course I teach on the history of ideas relating to free speech
and religious liberty uses very different readings but many of the
same procedures. Each week of the course is devoted to the study of
one classic writing in the tradition beginning with Milton's
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Areopagitica2 through the essays of Locke,3 Madison (a week each on
his Memorial and Remonstrance4 on religion and his Virginia Reports
on free speech), and Mill,6 then the breakthrough free speech
opinions of Hand,' Holmes,8 and Brandeis,9 and finally Alexander
Meiklejohn's essay on self-government ° and the Supreme Court's
opinion in New York Times v. Sullivan.1 I emphasize the need to
appreciate these writings in historical context, so the class materials
include biographical sketches and quite a bit of background
information concerning the political and intellectual struggles within
which each author wrote. Nevertheless, the focus of class discussion
and student inquiry remains on the detailed argumentation of each
essay or judicial opinion.
As with the courses on doctrine, I employ short papers to foster
critical engagement. Four times during the semester each student is
required to write a two-to-three-page answer to one of about ten
specific questions that appear in the course materials after each
principal essay or judicial opinion. The questions address the most
fundamental and problematic dimensions of the principal work. Class
discussion tends to focus on these questions. Frequently I solicit the
class's reaction to ideas contained in the written answers I have
received.
The ten-page critique plays the same role as in the courses on
doctrine, with one alteration. I include in the class materials after
each principal essay or opinion one of the best critiques of that work
that I have received in the past. These high-quality student critiques
add much to the course. They provide a valuable focus for class
discussion. They also give students numerous, tangible examples of
what makes for excellence in the very endeavor they are undertaking.
2. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (Edward Arber ed., A. Saifer 1972) (1644).
3. See JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (1689), reprinted in JOHN
LOCKE: A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION IN FOCUS 12 (John Horton & Susan Mendus
eds., 1991).
4. JAMES MADISON, FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE: A MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE
(1785), reprinted in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER 5 (Marvin Meyers ed., Bobbs-Merrill 1973).
5. JAMES MADISON, REPUBLICAN MANIFESTO: THE VIRGINIA REPORT (1799-1800),
reprinted in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER, supra note 4, at 229.
6. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Pub. Co.
1978) (1859).
7. See Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
8. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
9. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
10. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1948).
11. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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They set a high standard that challenges students to do their best.
Sometimes a student will use the critique in the class materials as a
foil for his own critique. Perhaps most important, these critiques
prove to students that they have as much to learn from their peers as
from their professor.
Again, I employ a relatively easy multiple choice examination to
ensure that the intensive writing experience does not cause students
to ignore the full range of the course.
Only during the last seven years have I built my large courses
around the ten-page critique. My experience is far more extensive
regarding seminar teaching. For about twenty years I have devoted
each seminar session to a thorough examination of just one law
review article. One student is required each week to produce a ten-
page critique, identifying as precisely as possible what aspects of the
article she finds less than fully convincing. This critique is due ten
days before the session at which the article is discussed so that the
rest of the seminar can read the critique in conjunction with their
reading of the article. Another student is given the assignment of
defending the article during the seminar discussion against both the
critique and any other objections that might surface. This "author's
advocate" produces no writing but is required to stay in role and
ordinarily is taxed to the intellectual hilt. When the article under
scrutiny is by a local author, I encourage the author's advocate to
collaborate with the actual author to figure out how to answer the
critique.
The first time I taught a seminar using this format I was truly
surprised by the intensity, quality, and spontaneity of student
participation. After a few weeks of breaking the ice, members of the
seminar began talking directly to each other about complicated ideas.
Every year since, I have watched much the same scenario unfold.
Surely part of this is due to the role-playing feature. But the major
cause of student engagement, I surmise, is the narrow focus of the
discussion. All of us are inhibited from jumping into substantive
discussions by guilt regarding what we have not read or cannot
remember. Students feel liberated and capable when all they must do
is come to class with a good command of one medium-length article-
seldom do I assign works longer than fifty pages, and members of the
seminar pledge to read each article at least twice-and the discussion
is designed to stay within the four corners of the author's argument.




The opportunity costs of choosing such a seminar format are no
doubt considerable. Students do not experience the organizational
demands, temptations to wallow, dead ends, and occasional exhilara-
tion of original research. Writing a closely reasoned, prescriptively
structured ten-page critique is a demanding undertaking, but it can be
done without learning much about how to identify a promising line of
inquiry or how to formulate an interesting thesis. Students in my
seminars acquire no specialized knowledge.
Despite all that does not happen in this format, I am now wedded
to it. For I am convinced that the typical student learns something
educationally distinctive from the experience of intensive, bounded
grappling with a series of first-rate articles. Not the least of what she
learns is how very difficult it is, even for the best of scholars, to
produce an argument that cannot be improved or discredited by a
genuinely engaged group of students. Demonstrating that week after
week is not a bad way to teach reasoning.
Whether about a landmark judicial opinion, a classic essay, or a
recent law review article, the ten-page critique can be an effective
teaching device. One reason is that it is hard to write a good ten-page
critique without first writing a good twenty-page critique. Among the
most difficult of reasoning skills to impart is prioritization. An
exercise that forces students to leave good material on the cutting
room floor has considerable educational value on that count alone.
Prioritization, in fact, is what we teachers most need to learn.
Law schools have never flagged in their desire to provide high-quality
instruction in reasoning. Postmodernist skepticism regarding the
value of reason has made only a mild ripple in this corner of the
university. But there just isn't time enough, at least after the first year,
to teach reasoning the right way: patiently, line-by-line and step-by-
step, with a narrow focus, attention to detail, and a great deal of re-
reading. To do that in the classroom, we protest, would require us to
leave other worthy pedagogic projects on the cutting room floor.
Exactly.
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